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Abstract 
This paper examines two collective choice mechanisms 
for achieving efficient stock market allocations. The first, 
proposed by Helpman and Razin, is shown to have the property that 
an equilibrium rarely exists. An alternative mechanism, due to 
Hurwicz, is examined and it is shown that the resulting equilibria 
under this mechanism do exist and are efficient. 
COLLECTIVE CHOICE MECHANISMS FOR ACHIEVING 
EFFICIENT STOCK MARKET ALLOCATIONS 
Robert Forsythe 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Much of the recent work in the theory of general equilibrium 
under uncertainty has been directed towards proposing and analyzing 
decision mechanisms for guiding the behavior of the firm when the 
set of markets present in the economy is not complete. Of particular 
interest are mechanisms which give rise to efficient allocations. In 
this context, efficiency should be understood to mean constrained 
Pareto optimality where the income of each individual is constrained 
to be a fixed share of random profits plus fixed nonrandom income. 
One approach is to consider market structures under which 
production sets of firms are spanned by the set of existing production 
plans.1 In this case any proposed change in a firm's production 
plan will be unanimously approved or rejected by its stockholders. 
The virture of this approach is that a firm may evaluate the change 
in its market value by using information which is available in the 
market values of all firms in the economy. 
Without restricting market structure, however, any decision 
mechanism a firm may use must reflect the tastes of its stockholders 
in order for it to make efficient decisions. Dreze [1974] has shown 
2 
that production efficiency will be attained if each firm maximizes 
its value according to an average of investors' marginal rates of 
substitution, where all investors' marginal rate of substitutions 
are weighted by their relative shareholdings the difficulty that arises 
with this mechanism is that all investors must reveal their own contingent 
claim prices to the firm, but, in general, they will not reveal 
truthfully. Much along this same line, Helpman and Razin [1978] 
describe a "participation equilibrium" in which stockholders make 
input contributions to firms and firms determine their input level as 
the sum of these contributions. Although this procedure provides 
appropriate incentives which give rise to efficient allocations, 
an equilibrium will, in general, fail to exist due to the particular 
cost sharing mechanism that is used. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, 
the general model is set up and the failure of a participation 
equilibrium to exist is demonstrated. Making use of the recent 
literature on incentive compatibility and public goods, Section 3 
examines an alternative cost sharing rule under which efficient 
equilibria exist. 
2. THE MODEL 
i 
Consider an economy consisting of I consumers, indexed 
l, • • .  ,I, and J firms, indexed j = l, . • .  ,J. There are two periods 
of time labelled 0 and 1, respectively. The true state of the world 
3 
which will occur in period 1 is not known in period 0 and there is 
a finite number, S, mutually exclusive states which may occur in 
period 1. There is a single commodity which is available for consumption 
in period 0, c0, or which may be invested in order to provide for 
consumption in period 1, if state of the world 8 occurs, c8, 8 = l, • • .  ,S. 
Each firm j has a market value V. and determines the level 
J 
of input to use as a solution to a noncooperative I-person game among 
the individuals. Each individual i chooses a quantity of input x� J 
given the choice made by all other individuals. The firm chooses the 
input level x. J 
debt in period 
fraction a� of J 
Helpman-Razin 
l x� and the firm finances these purchases by issuing 
j J 
O. In period 1, each individual must pay some pre-assigned 
firm j's debt, where la�= 1, j = l, . • .  ,J. (In the 
i J 
formulation each individual pays the same fraction 
a� = 1.I' of the cost of the quantity of input he has chosen, x
�. By 
J J 
requiring each individual to pay a fraction of each firm's total debt 
eliminates the need for lump-sum taxes to achieve a balanced budget 
in their model.) 
The ith individual is endowed with ii units of the input 
and a portfolio consisting of fractions y� of each firm j. Gross 
J 
returns are distributed to shareholders according to their shareholdings, 
where r.(8,x.) is the gross return of firm j in state 8, using input J J 
level x . •  The price of the input is w, the bond price is one, and the J 
return on one unit of bonds is r. 
Each individual i maximizes the utility of consumption by 
making input proposals x� and by choosing a portfolio of security J 
holdings, y�, and bond holdings, bi. Thus the decision problem of J 
each individual is2 
to maximize 
i i i i (c ,y ,b ,x )
subject to 
1 i i i u (c0,c1, • • •  ,c8)
i t i i -i t -i wco + l v. y. + b � wx + l v. y. 
i Ce < 
j JJ - j JJ
t i i t i l r.(e,x.)y. + rb - wr l a..x. j J J J j J J 
i 
> 0 > yj = ' xj = 0 j=l, . • .  ,J 
i 
> co = 
i 0, Ce 
> 0 .
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e = 1, . . .  , S
In this formulation a participation equilibrium is defined as
a price system (w, r, {V}), a consumption allocation ({c�,cf , • . .  ,c�}),
an ownership allocation ({y�}), a bond allocation ({bi}), and inputJ 
i proposals ({x.}) such thatJ 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
and 
(iv) 
ci,yi,bi, and xi are a solution to individual i's
decision problem, i = l, • . •  ,I, 
I c� +Ix. = I xi,
i j J i 
}:bi=w}:x.,
i j J 
I y� = 1, j = 1, . • .  , J . 
i J 
5 
As Helpman and Razin point out, equilibrium requires that 
individuals own positive fractions of every firm which operates 
1 a nonzero level of input since any individual, say i, who owns 
0 of firm j will choose x� =-Ix�. The difficulty with thisJ uiJ 
ilibrium concept is even more severe due to the existence of the 
-assigned cost shares, a�. In general it can be shown that noJ 
ilibrium exists in this model. To see this, consider the first 
.er conditions to each consumer's decision problem, which are 
ren by 3•4 
,ere 
w l pi(e)r.(e,x.) = V. 
e J J J 
L pi(e)rw = 1
e 
� Pi{e)(rj (e,xj )y� - a�rw) � 0 
pi(e)
. i aui/a ce e. ' ---;-. 'J. au]./ aco 
1, . . . ,s. 
j 1, . • •  ,J 
j 1, . . .  ,J 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
lenotes individual i's imputed contingent claim price for consumption 
ln the state e. 
As can be seen from (3), the difficulty which arises is due 
to the fact that the same x. must satisfy this condition for eachJ 
individual and thus the system of equations may often be over-identified. 
This is most easily seen by considering the case in which any proposed 
6 
change in the existing state distribution of returns lies in a subspace 
which is spanned by the existing return vectors. Spanning implies 
that there exists state-independent weights, sjk
' such that
rj (0,xj) l sjkrk(0,xk), 9 1, . .. ,s.
Using this assumption, (3) becomes 
0 
or that 
\' i I i i l P8 (r .(9,x.)Y. - a.rw)0 J r J J 
l l: s.kvkJ k J 
i i il: s.k y. l: P8Ikce,y - a. k J J 0 J
1 
w l: s.k/vk - a� k J J J
Cl�W.J 
Summing over i in (5) and using the fact that in equilibrium 
l Y� = l Cl� = 1, gives
i J i J 
l s.kvk = w,k J 
(4) 
(5) 
which on substituting back into (5) shows that in equilibrium that
all individuals will choose a portfolio which is identical with their 
pre-assigned costs shares, y� =Cl�. Furthermore, if cost shares areJ J 
chosen to be the initial portfolio holdings, y�, it can be seen that aJ 
7 
necessary condition for an equilibrium is that no trade takes place on 
the securities market, i.e., y� = y�. Thus, even with spanning, anJ J 
equilbrium exists only in the unlikely event that the prescribed 
constants have been set equal to equilibrium ownership fractions. 
Helpman-Razin also consider a one-period formulation 
and maintain that existence is more likely in that case. In that 
formulation, however, consumption in period 0 does not enter 
either the utility function or the period 0 budget constraint, and 
the first order conditions become 
and 
l p
i(8)r . (8,x.) = V. 
8 J J J j = 1, . . .  , J
l pi(8)(r'.(8,x.)/ - Cl�w) = 0 j = l, . . .  ,J 
8 J J J J 
where 
Pi(8) 
i iau /oc8
\' i irlau /oc8 8 
8 1, .. . ,S. 
Equation (5) follows as before, and the above demonstration
of nonexistence continues to hold. 
(l') 
(3') 
The following example further illustrates this difficulty. 
Example 
To demonstrate the nonexistence of a participation equilibrium 
consider an economy with two consumers, two firms, and two states of 
8 
the world where 
r if j = e rj(0,xj) = J 0 if j "' e 
i i i i and U (c0,c1,c2) 
i i i i i . c0 + B log c1 + (1 - B ) log c2, 0 < B < 1 for i = 1,2. 
Assume also that each individual has been assigned the same cost share 
for each firm (a�= 1/2 for i,j = 1,2). Then from the discussion J 
above, we must have in equilibrium Y� = 1/2 for i,j = 1,2. Using this J 
fact in the first order conditions (3) with respect to investment 
proposals gives 
thus 
___L_ 
i cl 
= 1 - B
i 
Ci 2 
1 for i 1,2. 
1 - Bi i c2 
i . x2Y2 + r(b
i i a w(x1 + x2)) 
and 
Bi i cl 
i i i x1y1 + r(b - a w(x1+ x2)). 
Subtracting (7) from (6) gives 
1 - 2Bi i 
i 
x2Y2 - xlyl 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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and in order for y� 
that 
i 
Y2 1/2 to be an equilibrium, (8) requires 
1 - 2Bi 
x2 - xl 
1/2 for i 1,2 
which will occur only if the preferences of both individuals are 
identical (i.e., B1 = B2). 
3. AN ALTERNATIVE INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE MECHANISM 
As illustrated by the example above, the difficulty which 
arises with the Helpman-Razin mechanism is that in equilibrium, 
each consumer's budget constraint must have the same normal vector 
(w, aiw) and they must be unanimous with respect to the input levels 
of each firm. This requires that their marginal rates of substitution 
at the agreed upon level of x must be proportional to the prespecif ied 
cost shares, ai. This problem is analogous to the one which arises 
in the public good literature when each consumer is confronted with 
a tax rule which is some prescribed share of the cost of the public 
good. 5 
For overcoming this difficulty, the literature on public 
goods provides some alternative mechanisms which may be adopted for 
this stock market model. As an illustration, consider the Shared 
Cost Mechanism presented by Hurwicz [1976]. This mechanism is in 
the spirit of the Helpman-Razin mechanism except that cost shares 
are no longer exogenous but rather are choice variables of each 
10 
consumer. Once again each individual is asked to make input 
suggestions, x�, and the firm ocntinues to operate at x. = l x� through 
J J i J 
debt financing. In addition, each individual is asked for the share 
of the cost of the debt financing which he is willing to transfer 
to others, a�. The amount which individual i must pay of firm j's 
J 
debt is given by 
t� = ( 1 - l a:
) 
rwx .  + M 
(
1 - l a:
) 
2 
J if.i J J i J 
(9) 
where M > O. Each individual's set of period 1 budget constraints 
become 
c� � f rj (0,xj )y1 + rb
i 
J 
l t�. 
j J 
By allowing cost shares to be decision variables, this 
(10) 
mechanism circumvents the existence problem which arose in the example 
of the previous section. Further, at a Nash equilibrium 
l a: = 1, j = 1, .. . ,J. 
i J 
To see this, note that a� affects consumer 
J 
i )2 . i only through the term M (l - l a. and thus t: can be decreased 
i J J 
(and hence each c� increased) simply by changing a� if l a1 f 1.
i 
In equilibrium, a� 
J 
= 1 - l a: becomes the share of cost paid by 
if i J 
consumer i. In equilibrium, with these endogenous cost shares, the 
budget set of each consumer coincides with the set each consumer 
faces in the Helpman-Razin formulation and their proof can be 
used to show that this mechanism achieves a constrained Pareto Optimum. 
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For the example in the previous section, it is easy to see 
that equilibrium cost shares will be chosen as equal to equilibrium 
ownership fractions. Since production decision are unanimously supported 
in this case there is no reason for cost shares to differ from ownership 
fractions. In general, however, this need not be the case. 
4. CONCLUSION 
The set of incentive compatible mechanisms, including the 
Helpman-Razin mechanism, are subject to the criticism that stockholders 
must have costs shares which are not, in general, the same as the 
ownership shares of each firm they hold. This will always occur when 
shareholdings are determined in some other manner. Under any mechanism 
which provides costs shares which are equal to ownership shares 
(i.e., y� = a�), then, as may be seen from (3), it must always be 
J J 
the case that the production decisions of the firm are unanimously 
supported. As shown by Leland [1973] unanimity will occur only 
if the spanning condition is satisfied. 
Thus, in order to construct a more satisfactory theory of the 
firm under general market structures, other nonmarket mechanisms must 
be explored. Hart [1977] has taken this approach in the study of 
take-over bid equilibrium and Benninga and Muller [1977] have studied 
the behavior of the firm under a majority rule mechanism. Unfortunately, 
neither of these approaches can insure equilibrium which are efficient. 
12 
FOOTNOTES 
1. See Ekern and Wilson [1974], Leland [1973, 1974] , and Radner [1974] . 
2. In the Helpman-Razin formulation, the budget constraint for
consumption in state of the world 8 is given by 
i < I ce ) i + bi !. � i - Ti e c8 = j rj ,xj yj r - I wr xj , J 
1, ... 's 
where Ti is a lump-sum tax on individual i, and I Ti = (I�l) wr Ix. 
i J 
is required in order to achieve a balance budget. 
3. Helpman and Razin assume that consumers take the value of each firm 
as independent of their actions. Since each consumer provides inputs, 
this "competitive" behavior seems to require a large number 
assumption. Alternatively one could make the competitivity 
assumption found in the unanimity literature (see Baron [1979j). This 
assumption requires that all consumer forecast valuation changes 
taking their own contingent claims prices as given. In this 
-i i case, y. would replace y. in (3).J J 
4. If the Helpman-Razin formulation is used (see footnote 3), it may 
be verified that the first order conditions remain the same with 
a.� replaced by t in (3).
5. In a pure public goods context, this problem has previously been
pointed out by Groves and Ledyard [1977] . 
13 
6. An overview of these mechanisms is given in Groves [1979] . 
14 
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